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Bebchuks Vorschlag zur Insolvenzrechtsreform wird beschrieben und analysiert, insbesondere seine 
Behauptung, dass der Gebrauch von Optionen fair sei und die Beteiligten dabei keinerlei Grund zur 
Klage hätten. Es wird gezeigt, dass es doch einige Gründe gibt, sich zu beklagen. Vor allem hat der 
Vorschlag einen systematischen Bias gegen nachrangige Gläubiger und vorherigen Anteilseigner, weil 
sie für unvermeidbare Fehler beim Einschätzen des Firmenwertes bezahlen müssen und ihnen die 
finanziellen Mittel zur Optionsausübung fehlen könnten. Eine Marktlösung wird vorgestellt, die fairer 




Bebchuk's proposal for bankruptcy reform is described and analyzed, in par-
ticular his claim that using options is fair and that the participants of such
a bankruptcy procedure have no basis to complain. It will be shown that
some reasons for complaining remain. Above all, the proposal has a sys-
tematic bias against junior creditors and former shareholders because they
have to pay for unavoidable mistakes in estimating the company's value and
may lack the ¯nancial resources to exercise their options. A market solution
will be speci¯ed that is fairer than Bebchuk's scheme according to his own
standards.
1Many thanks to Karsten de Ponte, Lutz Kruschwitz, Sandra Leissner, and Elmar
Wolfstetter. Financial support by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG) and my
parents is gratefully acknowledged. Some of this paper's ideas are part of my dissertation,
\Auktionen in Insolvenzen: Ein Vorschlag zur optimalen Gestaltung von Insolvenzver-
fahren", Logos Verlag, Berlin 1998.
2 Dr. Alexander Dilger, Ernst-Moritz-Arndt-Universitt Greifswald, Rechts- und Staats-
wissenschaftliche Fakultt, Loe²erstr. 70, D-17489 Greifswald, Germany. Phone: +49
(3834) 86-2474, Fax: +49 (3834) 86-2470, e-mail: dilger@uni-greifswald.de
1The Market is Fairer
than Bebchuk's Scheme
Symbols
bij portion of options exercised by participant j in class
i (6=1 )
Di total nominal value of claims or units of equity owned
by class i
dij nominal value of claims or units of equity owned by
participant j in class i
eij payments to (or in the case of eij < 0 from) partici-
pant j in class i
i index for classes of participants
j index for participants
k running index for participants
Ki number of participants in class i
l;m running indices for classes of participants
n number of classes of creditors
V value of a new share in the ¯rm
Z total new shares in the ¯rm
zij number of new shares that participant j in class i gets
21 Introduction
Twelve years ago Lucian Arye Bebchuk made a famous proposal for
bankruptcy reform.1 Its main idea is that the senior creditors of an insolvent
¯rm get the ¯rm, whereas junior creditors and the old owners get options to
buy it by paying the (senior) claims. There have been many positive reviews
of this proposal and other proposals for bankruptcy reform used Bebchuk's
one as their foundation.2
No major criticism has been voiced, just some doubts as to the practical
applicability of such a complicated proposal.3 In addition, the minor \un-
palatable feature that junior claimants may receive cash even when senior
creditors have not been fully paid" was judged to be a problem.4 Nobody
questioned Bebchuk's claims that \the participants will never end up with
less than the value to which they are entitled" and that \no participant will
have a justi¯able basis for complaining about the method's outcome",5 if
his proposal is implemented. In this article it will be shown that reasons
for complaining remain. The market solution in which all shares are sold
at one market clearing price is fairer than the scheme proposed by Bebchuk
according to his own standards.
In the next section Bebchuk's proposal will be outlined. It will be ex-
plained why and in which sense there should be no reason for complaining
about the proposal's outcomes. The third section is an examination of re-
maining reasons for complaining. At least one of them seems to be rather
strong. Junior creditors are at a disadvantage since they would make mis-
takes in estimating the value of the insolvent ¯rm. It is true that they are
making these mistakes by themselves, but they cannot avoid them. They
are forced to make mistakes. Therefore, in section 4 a market solution will
1Bebchuk (1988). For the newest version of his proposal see Bebchuk (2000).
2See Aghion/Hart/Moore (1992), Aghion/Hart/Moore (1995) and Hart/La Porta
Drago/Lopez-de-Silanes/Moore (1997). See Dilger (1999) for a critique of the proposal
by Aghion/Hart/Moore, which is adopted by Bebchuk (2000) in its main parts.
3Aghion/Hart/Moore (1992).
4Hart/La Porta Drago/Lopez-de-Silanes/Moore (1997), p. 10. They propose as a
remedy against this feature the additional use of an inside auction.
Bebchuk (2000) answers to some of the objections to his proposal. He announces for
1999 a paper \to address all the questions that have been raised about the proppsal", p.
2, but this has not been released as yet.
5Bebchuk (1988), p. 777.
3be speci¯ed that gives less reasons for complaing and is therefore fairer than
Bebchuk's scheme. Section 5 concludes.
2 Bebchuk's Proposal
The main problem that Bebchuk's proposal is meant to solve is the fair
distribution of the value of an insolvent ¯rm between the creditors and the
former owners, in short the participants. If there were no di®erent classes
of participants and therefore no order of seniority between classes, then the
distribution would be easy. Each participant could get shares in the ¯rm
according to the portion of claims he previously had on the insolvent ¯rm.
Since there are di®erent classes the claims of senior creditors have to be
ful¯lled before junior creditors are entitled to get anything. In order to
maintain absolute priority, the junior creditors also have to be paid o® before
the former owners can get the rest.
2.1 The Distribution of a Given Amount
Observing the rule of absolute priority is not di±cult as long as the value of
the insolvent ¯rm is known. Consider the case of liquidation. Every asset of
the ¯rm is sold piecemail or the whole company is sold as one unit for cash.
Afterwards the amount of cash is known and can be distributed without
violating absolute priority. All senior classes have to be paid o® completely
before a junior class gets anything. If anything remains after all debts have
been paid to the creditors, this belongs to the old owners of the ¯rm. Inside
the classes the money is distributed in proportion to the former claims of the
participants.
Using the symbols de¯ned at the beginning of this article, a given amount
Z ¢V of money would be distributed to the individual participants according

















































2.2 The Case of Uncertainty
Bebchuk argues that a liquidation of the insolvent ¯rm may not be optimal
for the participants.6 A piecemail liquidation is suboptimal, if the company
has a higher value as a going concern than the sum of its separate assets.
Selling the whole company is not a good idea as long as there are not enough
potential buyers who are su±ciently informed and have the necessary money.
Without liquidation there has to be a reorganization by the participants
themselves. But the reorganization procedure according to Chapter 11 of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code violates the principle of absolute priority and opens
the way for ine±cient rent-seeking behavior. Therefore, Bebchuk proposes to
allocate shares and options in the ¯rm without neglecting the given seniority
of claims.
As long as the value of the ¯rm is obvious to all, it is easy to allocate
its shares. The allocation of shares simply follows the allocation of a given
amount of money. Di±culties arise as soon as the value of the ¯rm is uncer-
tain. If there is one binding estimate of the value, failures in the estimate
threaten to put some classes at a disadvantage. The senior creditors are
getting too few shares if the estimate is too high. If it is too low the senior
creditors are getting too many shares. Even if the estimate is correct in some
cases, all classes will complain, because the correctness is not obvious. Senior
creditors always want low estimates, high estimates are in favor with junior
creditors and former shareholders. The problem of fair distribution comes
down to the problem of ¯nding the right estimate.
Bebchuk's brilliant solution to this problem is to let each participant make
his own estimate. If there is one binding estimate for all, all participants will
protest that it is too high or too low, but in any case wrong and unfair. If,
instead, everybody has his own estimate, nobody can object to it. Instead
of complaining that he gets too few shares because his estimate is too high,
a senior creditor could simply lower his own estimate. Likewise, a junior
6Bebchuk (1988), p. 776.
5creditor or former shareholder cannot protest that he gets too few shares,
because he could raise his estimate and get more.
2.3 The Distribution of and by Options
How is it possible that every participant can use his own estimate of the com-
pany's value, even if di®erent participants have widely di®ering estimates?
Bebchuk's idea is to use options. To begin with, the most senior credi-
tors, the participants of class 1, get all the shares in the new ¯rm, which
is the insolvent ¯rm without any remaining debts. All other creditors and
the shareholders of the old, insolvent ¯rm get no shares, but options to buy
shares by paying o® the more senior creditors.
The participants of class 2, the creditors with the second highest senior-
ity, get the option to buy shares from the most senior creditors at a price
corresponding to the original claims of the most senior creditors. Thereby
the class 2 does not have to act uniformly, but each individual creditor gets
his own options and can decide to exercise them as he likes. As an example,
the sum D1 of the claims of the most senior creditors may be $ 2,000, the
sum D2 of the claims of class 2 $ 5,000 and there are 10,000 new shares.
Each of the most senior creditors provisionally gets 5 shares for every dollar
the insolvent ¯rm owed him. But he has to hand over a share whenever he
gets 20 cents for it from one of the junior creditors. The participants of class
2 get the option to buy 2 shares at a price of 20 cents each for every dollar
the insolvent ¯rm owed them.
The same holds for all classes of participants. Every participant gets
options in proportion to his claims. He can buy shares at a price as high as
the corresponding share of all more senior claims has been. He loses shares to
junior participants if they pay o® his claims. If the old owners exercise their
options, then they can keep the shares for sure, because nobody is junior to
them and they are entitled to any residual after all debts have been paid.
There will be the following distribution of money and shares in the new
company after everyone has exercised his options.7 The symbols are used as
7The presentation of Bebchuk (1988) is not complete, especially for the unlikely cases
of junior classes exercising some options whereas more senior creditors do not exercise
theirs. Bebchuk explains in a footnote, p. 788, why this should not happen, at least as
long as there is a market for options: options which are not exercised have no value, thus
the junior classes should have bought them from the more senior creditors at a low price
6de¯ned at the beginning of this article. A most senior creditor j gets in cash




































A creditor j of class i,1<i<n+1 ; gets or pays in money
eij = dij ¡
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and receives the following number of shares
















A former shareholder j has to pay an amount of







and the number of shares he gets for this is




The participants have the opportunity to trade the shares and, in partic-
ular, the options. Thus participants who estimate the value of the company
instead of exercising their own options by using more money. Nevertheless, every possible
case should be de¯ned. This is done here in a consistent and incentive compatible way.
7lower than others can sell their options. If someone does not want to ex-
ercise his option, but sells it in the market, he earns something instead of
receiving nothing. If someone thinks his option has some value but he can
sell it at a higher price in the market, he earns more instead of receiving less.
Also participants who lack the necessary money to exercise their options can
pro¯t from the options' market, if they can sell their options which otherwise
would have been useless to them. Finally, an option market is an important
source of information for the participants.
2.4 The Fairness of the Distribution
Independently of the trading opportunity, the outcome of Bebchuk's mech-
anism will be fair according to him: \The proposed method addresses the
possibility of di®erent subjective estimates by enabling each participant to
decide individually, based on his own estimate of the reorganized company's
value, whether to exercise his rights. Consequently, each participant will get
no less, and may indeed get more, than the value to which he believes he is
entitled based on his own estimate of the reorganization value."8 Therefore,
\no participant has any basis for complaining about the method's outcome."9
This will be shown for the di®erent classes of participants in more detail.
To begin with, the participants of class 1, the most senior creditors cannot
complain, no matter what happens. Possibly some junior class exercises all
its options and the most senior creditors get their claims paid o® instead of
shares. \In this case, the senior creditors surely cannot complain about the
outcome, as their claims will be paid in full."10 Another possibility is that
no participant exercises his option. Then the most senior creditors get all
shares of the new ¯rm. \Again, they will have no basis for complaining, for
they will be getting the whole reorganization pie: there is nothing more that
could be given to them."11 Finally, a mixed result is possible, the most senior
creditors ending up with some money and some shares. But for each part the
arguments given above are true. As far as these creditors get money, their
claims are paid o®. Their shares contain the remaining value of the company.
8Bebchuk (1988), p. 794, italics in the original.
9Bebchuk (1988), p. 790.
10Bebchuk (1988), pp. 790 f.
11Bebchuk (1988), p. 791.
8The creditors of all other classes have no reason to complain, either, ac-
cording to Bebchuk.12 If their options are redeemed because participants
junior to them exercised their options, then their claims are ful¯lled. Oth-
erwise they have the choice to exercise their options or not. \The value of
these options is by de¯nition not lower than the value to which the credi-
tors are entitled { for the junior creditors are entitled to no more than the
value that is left, if any, after the senior creditors are paid in full."13 If they
exercise their options, they have to pay the claims of the creditors senior
to them and get shares in the new ¯rm for this. As a result they get what
they are entitled to according to the rule of absolute priority. If they do not
exercise their options, they get nothing. But this is correct as long as they
estimate the value of the ¯rm to be lower than the claims of the more senior
creditors. If they estimate this value to be higher, then they should exercise
their options.
Finally, the old shareholders have no reason to complain. Their \options
will make accessible to them the very value to which they are entitled { which
is all that is left, if anything, after the claims of the senior and junior creditors
are paid in full."14 If they do not exercise their options, then they estimate
by themselves the value of the ¯rm to be lower than its former debts.15
Bebchuk stresses that the fairness of his proposed method does not de-
pend on the existence of e±cient markets where the options and shares can
be traded.16 Accordingly, such markets have not been used in the arguments
above why none of the participants has reason to object to the method's
outcome. Trading opens new opportunities, fairness should exist without
it. This is important to Bebchuk because, if there is any advantage of his
proposal to others, then it is the fact that fairness exists independently of
the functioning of markets. If e±cient markets exist, the allocation of shares
according to absolute priority is no problem because these markets generate
one common estimate of the ¯rm's value.
12Bebchuk (1988), pp. 791 f.
13Bebchuk (1988), p. 791.
14Bebchuk (1988), p. 792.
15This is to be expected because otherwise there should not have been a bankruptcy at
all.
16Bebchuk (1988), pp. 789 f. See also 3.3 below.
92.5 Additional Features
Bebchuk's proposal has some more features than just the options. First of
all, the \proposed reorganization regime will include, as any reorganization
regime must, a preliminary process of determining the size and ranking of
participants' claims; this process may be straightforward at times, but it also
may be complex and time-consuming at other times. Once the participants'
claims are identi¯ed, however, the process of division will proceed smoothly
and quickly."17
Second, Bebchuk believes that \a reorganization plan will be necessary to
¯x some limited elements of the reorganized company's features."18 Bebchuk
mentions the capital structure of the new ¯rm as such an element. He thinks
it does not matter who designs the reorganization plan, which nevertheless
needs to be con¯rmed by a supervising court. \Given the way in which the
proposed method operates, the choice of capital structure cannot be used to
divert value from one class of participants to another. Therefore, in choosing
the capital structure, the party charged with designing the reorganization
plan will aim solely at maximizing the value of the reorganized company."19
Third, the old, now insolvent ¯rm may have had some contracts which
had favorable terms for the ¯rm. As an example, there could have been a long
term loan at a low interest rate, whereas the market interest rate has risen
in the meantime. If the contract of this loan is canceled and the creditor
is give shares or options like all other creditors, then this creditor could
pro¯t from the insolvency at the cost of all other participants. It would
be better if the new company could maintain such contracts. According
to Bebchuk, this problem for every insolvency procedure can be solved by
using the reorganization plan. Any \designers of the plan presumably will
choose to reinstate only those contracts whose reinstatement will maximize
the pie available to the rest of the participants. The parties to the reinstated
contracts will have claims that are not impaired and they therefore will not
participate in the division of rights."20
Fourth, there are secured claims. They have a special priority concerning
speci¯c assets. One can deal with them in several di®erent ways. The secured
17Bebchuk (1988), p. 798.
18Bebchuk (1988), p. 798.
19Bebchuk (1988), p. 798.
20Bebchuk (1988), p. 802.
10creditor may have the right to take the securing asset out of the ¯rm and
to utilize it by himself or he may just have the right to get the estimated
value of the asset in cash.21 \Whichever arrangement we wish to apply to
secured claims, the proposed method of division will be consistent with it.
The arrangement will govern the identi¯cation of fully secured claims and
their treatment under the reorganization plan."22
Finally, Bebchuk sees the problem that some participants could end up
with a large portion of shares. This is a problem \because shares in a con-
trolling block are worth more than minority shares."23 A concentration of
shares would redistribute value from the minority shareholders to the block-
holders. Bebchuk recommends a proposal of Roe (1986) to deal with this
problem, which he sees to be present in any reorganization: \If the exercise
of rights provides someone with a controlling block of the reorganized com-
pany's equity, then the holder of this controlling block should be required to
dispose of his controlling position { by selling enough shares to go below a
speci¯ed control threshold { within a speci¯ed period of time. Under such a
rule, those who exercise rights will be able to count on receiving shares that,
at least after a speci¯ed period of time, will not be minority shares."24
3 Reasons for Complaining
There are several reasons why participants could complain about the outcome
of Bebchuk's mechanism. Complaints about the lost money caused by the
insolvency, which are probably heard most often in practice, are not a valid
argument against the proposal. In additon, two other rather weak arguments
will be examined. First, someone may object that others (or he himself) get
too much instead of too little, which would be a form of breaking absolute
priority. Second, participants could object that they lack the necessary in-
formation to make a meaningful estimate of the company's value. Whereas
this is not really convincing, a much stronger critique of the proposed mech-
anism is close at hand. Insu±cient information and failures in estimation
21See also the interesting proposal of Bebchuk/Fried (1996) to limit the priority of
secured creditors.
22Bebchuk (1988), p. 803.
23Bebchuk (1988), p. 803.
24Bebchuk (1988), pp. 803 f.
11have di®erent consequences for the participants. Junior participants are sys-
tematically at a disadvantage. Another strong point, mentioned by Bebchuk
but without a convincing counterargument, is the lack of money which could
prevent participants from exercising their options. This is another bias of the
proposed mechanism against the junior participants. Finally, some problems
concerning the proposed reorganization plan and other additional features of
Bebchuk's proposal will be shown.
3.1 Losses in the Insolvency
There are protests against the high losses in every insolvency. Quite regularly
one can read critical comments about the high number of insolvencies and the
high losses of money and jobs in newspapers and other popular publications.
These protests would continue if Bebchuk's insolvency procedure were intro-
duced. Nevertheless, this is not a serious argument against his proposal.25
These protests do not di®erentiate between the losses that caused an insol-
vency and those that were caused by an insolvency procedure. An e±cient
procedure should minimize the losses which are there anyway and emerged
quite independently of the procedure.
3.2 Getting Too Much
In 2.4 it has been shown that everybody gets what he is entitled to according
to his own estimate of the company's value. Thus, nobody can complain that
he gets too little. Nevertheless, someone may perceive that he or someone
else gets too much. As Bebchuk writes, \each participant will get no less, and
may indeed get more, than the value to which he believes he is entitled".26
On the one hand, it could be seen as a great advantage of the proposed
procedure that the participants can get more than what they are entitled
to. On the other hand, one could regard it as a special form of violating the
principle of absolute priority. Some junior participants may receive nothing
25The same holds for protests against wrong evaluations of shares and options on the
market. The participants \can complain about the market (`oh, the market is not what
it is supposed to be') but not about the method's way of dividing" shares and options
(Bebchuk (1988), p. 791).
26Bebchuk (1988), p. 794, italics added.
12whereas senior ones receive more than they themselves believe to be entitled
to.
The point here is that everyone uses his own estimate. If one estimate
is declared to be the objective one then, indeed, there can be violations of
absolute priority because some participants may have used other estimates.
However, senior participants can only get too much in their own or some
one else's eyes as long as at least one junior participant does not think so
but exercises options because he estimates the company's value higher or
does not exercise them because he estimates the value lower than the senior
participants or an external observer. Nobody can complain that he himself
does not get enough, whatever his own estimate of the value may be. More
should not be expected. If somebody is envious because he thinks someone
else is getting too much by the wrong estimation and foolish behavior of a
third person, he still cannot object that he himself gets to little, whereas
envy alone should not be an argument. Indeed, if somebody is so noble that
he objects to taking more than he thinks he is entitled to, he could give the
amount he received above his own evaluation to other participants27 or the
poor.
3.3 Insu±cient Information
Participants could object that they lack the necessary information to make
reasonable estimates of the company's value. If someone has an estimate,
he can guarantee himself what he is entitled to according to this estimate.
But what happens if someone is not able to come up with an estimate?
Without an estimate, even a merely subjective one, it is not possible for
junior participants to make decisions about exercising their options.
The counterargument to these objections is that it is always necessary to
make decisions under incomplete information. There is no di®erence in this
regard between the case of insolvency and any other situation of (economic)
life. Even if someone has no information at all, he may ¯nd himself in a
situation where it is necessary to make decisions. Doing nothing would be a
decision, too, although a bad one in many cases. Mere guessing or °ipping a
coin are possible decision procedures in the absence of information.
27This could be a problem, if these other participants are equally noble, because thanks
to Bebchuk's mechanism no participant believes in getting too little. Such people could
beg each other in vain to take money!
13The absolute amounts of information and lacking information are not
reasons for complaining. So Bebchuk is right that the relative di®erences
between di®erent insolvency procedures is decisive: \Under the proposed
method, as well as under the existing process of division, participants must
make decisions on the basis of whatever information they have concerning the
reorganized company's value. Therefore, it is necessary to examine whether,
in comparison to the existing process, the proposed method might either
increase the amount of information that participants need or decrease the
amount of information that they possess."28 One quali¯cation is necessary,
though. The comparison has not only to include the proposed and the ex-
isting insolvency procedure but also other possible candidates for insolvency
reform.
Bebchuk argues that the participants need less information under his
procedure than under the existing one: \under the proposed method, par-
ticipants will not even need to make a judgment, as they must under the
existing process, concerning their best estimate of the reorganized company's
value. They will only have to make the much more limited judgment whether
the reorganized company's value exceeds the estimate that is implicit in the
market price of their rights (that is, whether the value of their rights ex-
ceeds the rights' market price)."29 They also have more information under
his procedure than under the existing one: \there is no reason to assume that
participants will have less information under the proposed method than un-
der the existing process. Indeed, the proposed method provides an important
additional source of information { the market pricing of rights."30 Because
the participants need less and have more information than at present, if
Bebchuk's proposal is realized, the participants then cannot protest about
insu±cient information.
This conclusion would be ¯ne, but its premises are questionable. To start
with, it is not correct that the participants \will only have to make the much
more limited judgment whether the reorganized company's value exceeds the
estimate that is implicit in the market price of their rights".31 If a participant
thinks the market price is higher than the value of the ¯rm, he has indeed
nothing more to do than to sell his rights, his options or shares to the market.
28Bebchuk (1988), p. 795.
29Bebchuk (1988), p. 795.
30Bebchuk (1988), p. 795.
31Bebchuk (1988), p. 795.
14In this case it does not matter what the correct value is. But this case is
quite rare, an underrating by the market has to be expected to justify the
whole proposal: \the primary rationale for the existence of the reorganization
alternative to liquidation is the concern that the market often undervalues
such companies; if the market could be relied on to price such companies
perfectly, there would be no reason to expect that a reorganization would
ever provide the participants with a greater value than they would get from
a going-concern sale e®ected through a chapter 7 liquidation proceeding."32
However, if the market price is too low, it does not help the participants
to decide whether to exercise their options. They need an estimate of the
company's value. At least they have to know whether the value of a share is
higher or lower than the exercising price.
This shows that the participants normally do not need less information
under Bebchuk's proposal, when compared with the present state. In a
way they need more, because every single participant has to make his own
decisions and therefore his own estimate. Under the present procedure whole
classes can decide and estimate, whereas individual participants do not have
this problem (and can complain ex post about wrong estimates).
It is also questionable whether the participants have more information
under Bebchuk's proposal than now. As has been shown, the market is not a
reliable source of information in this context. Conversely, there may be less
information under Bebchuk's proposal as he himself acknowledges: \the pro-
posed method may still reduce the amount of information that participants
will have if it substantially decreases the extent to which participants take
advantage of the available sources of information. Such a decrease may ar-
guably take place because of collective action problems: under the proposed
method, participants will act individually rather than collectively, and they
may have less incentive or ability to look for information."33 Bebchuk sees
the possibility of working together as a remedy against this problem: \the
proposed method will not prevent participants from acquiring information as
a class rather than individually when there are some advantages in doing so:
in such cases, the committee representing the class will likely engage in infor-
mation acquisition (say, by hiring an investment banker to do the job) and
32Bebchuk (1988), p. 789.
33Bebchuk (1988), p. 795 f.
15then disseminate its conclusions to individual class members."34 However,
the collective action problem does not consist in a prohibition of working
together. The problem is how to organize the collective action if nobody has
su±cient individual incentives to do so. The present reorganization proce-
dure organizes the classes and their representatives by law. It is much more
di±cult to do this individually, especially if there are many individuals.
In conclusion, there are at least some doubts whether Bebchuk's proposal
really is at an advantage concerning information relative to the existing re-
organization law. If other possible procedures are considered, these doubts
grow. Imagine the shares being distributed according to the estimate of the
company's value by an investment bank. Then a specialist could use e±-
cient means to gather information, there would not be a parallel search for
the same information, the participants could take it easy, but if they have
some favorable information, they could hand it over to the investment bank.
Auctions could also be a more e±cient way to use information. Neverthe-
less, more fundamental objections to the lack of information are not justi¯ed.
Information is always scarce, its availability is a matter of degree.
3.4 Bias of Failures in Estimation
As has been shown in 2.4, Bebchuk's proposal is fair in the sense that, if some
participant has an estimate of the company's value, he can get what he is
entitled to according to his own estimate. It has also been argued in 3.3 that
the necessity to make estimates is no objection to the proposal. Information
is seldom complete. It is often necessary to make estimates or even guess.
Thereby one can overestimate as well as underestimate. But as long as there
is no bias and systematic failure, these mistakes should cancel each other out
so that one is right on the average. Therefore, one gets the expected value
of what one is entitled to.
The decisive critique of Bebchuk's proposal is that it does not even give
the junior participants the expected value of what they are entitled to. Since
the participants have to estimate the value of the ¯rm, they will surely not
pick out the correct value every time { otherwise they would not be estimating
but determining the value. The crucial point is that their mistakes do not
cancel each other out on average. Every time there is a di®erence between
34Bebchuk (1988), p. 796.
16the estimated and the real value, they can only lose, never win. At best a
di®erence does not matter.
On the one hand, if a junior participant overestimates the company's
value, he can lose by deciding to exercise his option although it would have
been better not to do so. This is the case if he estimates a share's value to
be above the exercising price of the option whereas the true value is below.
In other cases the overestimation has no costs but also no gains. These other
cases are those in which the estimated and the real value are both below or
both above the exercising price.
On the other hand, if a junior participant underestimates the company's
value, he can lose by deciding not to exercise his option although he should
have done so. This is the case if he estimates a share's value to be under
the exercising price whereas the true value is higher. There are also other
cases in which underestimating is free of cost but there are no gains, either.
These cases are again those in which the estimated and the real value are
both below or both above the exercising price.
This means a junior participant loses every time a divergence of the esti-
mated from the real value matters for his decision to exercise his options.35
The winners are the senior participants who get either more shares or more
money than they are entitled to by the failures in estimation. This bias
against junior participants is a clear violation of absolute priority. It is no
excuse that the junior participants are making the estimates which hurt them
by themselves because they are forced to estimate and to thereby make mis-
takes. As long as they are not able to determine the true value of the ¯rm
exactly they cannot expect to get the expected value of their entitlement.
This constitutes a sound justi¯cation for complaining about the fairness of
Bebchuk's proposal.
3.5 Lack of Money
Another important objection to Bebchuk's proposal could be the absence of
su±cient ¯nancial means. If junior participants want but lack the necessary
money to exercise their options, they cannot get the value to which they are
entitled according to their own estimates. This is an argument Bebchuk sees
35An overestimation of the shares' value on the market for options could bene¯t the
junior participants. However, such an overestimation is rare as has been argued in 3.3.
17himself: A \possible objection to the method arises from the fact that the
method will require some participants to invest in the enterprise to capture
the value to which they are entitled. Participants in an insolvent company,
so the argument might go, may reasonably be reluctant to make such an
investment or may lack the necessary ¯nancial resources."36
Bebchuk has three counterarguments against this: \although the need to
invest funds might pose some problems to the e®ectiveness of the proposed
method, these problems appear to be quite limited. Most participants will
not need to invest any amount in order to capture the value to which they
believe they are entitled, because their rights will be either redeemed or
valued su±ciently by the market. Furthermore, those who will need to invest
will have no basis for complaining as long as the amount at stake is small
relative to their wealth. Finally, as for those whose rights will be neither
redeemed nor su±ciently valued by the market and whose wealth is not
su±ciently large relative to the amount at stake, any problem resulting from
the need to invest will be mitigated by their ability to borrow."37 It will be
shown that all three counterarguments are not convincing and reasons to
complain remain.
First, it is true that some participants will not have to invest money
because their claims will be redeemed or because they can sell their options in
the market. However, these are only the more senior participants who would
have to pay low exercising prices anyway. One of the classes of participants
near the real value of the company has to put in an amount of money as
high as the claims of all more senior classes. Not all claims can be redeemed,
someone has to do the redeeming. The market for options is no help because
it normally underestimates the company's value.38
Second, Bebchuk may be right that \the amounts that participants need
to invest to exercise their rights are small relative to their wealth, which I
suspect is the case for most participants in reorganizations of publicly traded
corporations".39 But most is not all, and the few participants for whom this
is di®erent are the ones that matter. In many insolvencies there are some
creditors who gave substantial credits and are at risk of becoming insolvent
themselves simply because they lose their claims. Whereas they hardly have
36Bebchuk (1988), p. 796.
37Bebchuk (1988), p. 797.
38See 3.3.
39Bebchuk (1988), p. 797.
18the wealth to bear their own losses, they clearly lack the money to pay o®
the probably much larger claims of the creditors senior to them.
Third, the creditors who do not possess the money to exercise their claims
should be able to borrow it, according to Bebchuk. \In a well-functioning
capital market, the junior creditor's borrowing power will be augmented by
his ability to use as collateral the very" shares he wants to buy.40 However,
the markets cannot be expected to function well, otherwise the whole pro-
posal would be unnecessary.41 Even if there were well-functioning capital
markets, only small sums could be borrowed by using the shares as collateral
because these shares are a quite risky investment, and the participant would
have to take the risk. Thus, some participants with large claims are not
able to exercise their options at all. Others may be able to do so by using
all of their own money and lending some more, but they have to pay the
costs of lending as well as the opportunity costs of other uses of their wealth.
They even have to take all the large risks which are not only inherent in the
company but also follow from the estimation process.
3.6 Complaints about the Reorganization Plan and
Additional Features
There can be complaints about the reorganization plan, too. Some partici-
pants may want something to be di®erent from the arrangements in the plan.
Bebchuk thinks it does not matter who makes the plan, his proposal guaran-
tees that everybody has the same goal of maximizing the company's value.42
This seems to be rather naive. Not only do many participants have special
interests concerning the arrangements besides maximizing value, but many
other participants have no interests at all, not even in maximizing value. For
example, banks may have special interests in the ¯nancial structure because
they want to lend to the ¯rm or like to give loans rather than to hold shares.43
Many other participants have no interest in maximizing value because they
cannot gain by it. The participants of the most junior classes may be certain
to get nothing anyway, therefore they have no incentive to invest any e®ort
40Bebchuk (1988), p. 797.
41See 3.3.
42Bebchuk (1988), p. 798.
43Other interested participants are those whose contracts could be reinstated. See below.
19in maximizing the company's value. The most senior classes may be sure to
get get all their claims repaid. Only a few classes in between which stand
to gain from maximizing value are interested in it. However, laws or a judge
cannot ¯x these classes in advance.
A simple solution to this problem would be to forego a reorganization
plan. This plan is not needed in advance. The shareholders can make most
arrangements by themselves. They are also interested in maximizing the
value they own.
Some problems remain. The reinstating of contracts favorable to the ¯rm
will lead to some complaints. Bebchuk holds that \parties to the reinstated
contracts will have claims that are not impaired".44 Legally this may be
correct, economically it is not. The partner of their contracts has been in-
solvent in the meantime, its whole structure changed and a new insolvency
with less value to distribute is at least possible. Nevertheless, perhaps they
have no reason to object as long as the new ¯rm ful¯lls all the duties from
the old contracts. Even if they have such a reason for objection, this does
not need to be an argument against Bebchuk's proposal. It is not necessary
that nobody at all has any reason to complain. Even justi¯ed complaints are
no argument against any procedure as long as they are possible against all
procedures. The relative merits of one insolvency procedure compared to its
alternatives are decisive, not absolute standards.
Finally, the proposed treatment of claims' concentration shall be consid-
ered. There are at least three problems. First, Bebchuk infers a loss of value
for the minority shareholders from the rising value of shares in a controlling
block.45 This would only be correct, if the company's value were ¯xed, as is
the case in all his examples. But the company's value could depend on the
distribution of shares and rise with some concentration, if the existence of
larger shareholders helps to monitor the managers of the ¯rm and improves
their performance.46 Second, the holder of a large block of shares may be
at a disadvantage, if he is forced to sell many shares in a short time on an
underrating market. A large creditor may have no fault that he ends up
with many shares. He has a reason to protest, if he is not allowed to realize
the full value of his shares. Third, there may be only one or a few potential
44Bebchuk (1988), p. 802.
45Bebchuk (1988), p. 803.
46See Demsetz/Lehn (1985), Grossman/Hart (1988), Shleifer/Vishney (1988) and Bar-
clay/Holderness (1991).
20buyers of many shares in the market. They are responsible for buying a
controlling block, but the question is whether they should be prevented from
doing so. Perhaps the ¯rm's value is maximized by selling it to one such
investor. Quantitative restrictions in the market for options and shares do
not improve its performance, either.
4 Why the Market is Fairer than Bebchuk's
Scheme
In the following it will be shown why and how the market is fairer than
the scheme proposed by Bebchuk. It is not claimed that a market solution
is perfectly fair and no reasons for complaining remain. However, it will
be shown that a well-designed market solution dominates Bebchuk's scheme
in regard to fairness considerations. There are less reasons for complaining
about the market than about Bebchuk's proposal, whereas there is no case in
which somebody can complain about the market where he cannot also object
to Bebchuk's scheme.
The market solution that dominates Bebchuk's scheme is as follows: The
shares of the new debtfree company are sold in a multi-unit auction. Everyone
can submit bids, specifying the number of shares he wants at any price.
Then, all shares are sold at the one price that clears the market. Outside
bidders with bids as high as or higher than this price have to pay the price
in cash. Former participants have to pay the price in cash, too, but they
can deduct from it the money they are entitled to by the distribution of the
auction's revenue because the price of all shares, the revenue of the auction,
is distributed to the former participants according to the rule of absolute
priority.47
Why is this market procedure fairer than Bebchuk's scheme? First of all,
every participant can guarantee himself the same result as by using options
without paying a higher price. If a participant submits a bid as high as the
exercising price of the next higher class of participants,48 then, in the auction
he pays at most the exercising price of the options of his class and gets shares,
or he receives the money the old company owed him. This means the market
47For this rule see 2.1.
48One of the former shareholders can submit a bid as high as possible.
21procedure can do everything Bebchuk's scheme is supposed to do. It is fair
according to Bebchuk's standards. Everyone can guarantee himself what he
believes to be entitled to. If a participant believes that the company has a
higher value than the claims of all creditors senior to himself, he can submit
a bid to get his entitlement which is either shares in the ¯rm by paying o®
the senior creditors or the ful¯llment of his claims in cash. This is exactly
what Bebchuk considers to be fair and what he proposed the options for.49
Moreover, using the auction is even fairer than Bebchuk's scheme. No
participant has to pay more in the auction compared to exercising the options,
but some may get their shares for less. This is an improvement because
it has been shown in section 3 that Bebchuk's scheme has a bias against
junior participants. Therefore, it is an improvement that the shares are
sometimes cheaper for the junior participants without violating the rights
of senior participants. That the rights of the more senior participants are
not violated follows simply from the fact that they can guarantee themselves
what they think to be entitled to in the same way that all other participants
can do this. Nevertheless, shares can be cheaper in the auction than the
exercise price of options because not all more senior creditors need to bid as
high as this price. If they estimate the ¯rm's value to be lower or do not want
to take the risk, they may bid lower to the bene¯t of the junior participants,
who have to pay a lower price to get shares. The junior participants do not
have to take all the risk of failures in estimation. They also do not have to
exercise an option or submit a bid to get anything because they always get
their share of the auction's revenue.50 The fairness of the auction is higher
than that of Bebchuk' scheme, even though it may not be perfect.
An example may help to see the point made here. Consider the example
from 2.3. The sum D1 of the claims of the most senior creditors is $ 2,000, the
sum D2 of the claims of class 2 is $ 5,000 and there are 10,000 new shares. A
participant of class 2 can guarantee himself the same or a better result in the
auction as under Bebchuk's proposal if he bids 70 cents for each share, the
number of shares he bids for being two times as high the amount of dollars
the insolvent ¯rm owed him.51 If the market price of the share is below 20
49Compare 2.4.
50Accordings to Bebchuk's proposal participants have to take the risk of exercising their
options to get anything, unless more junior participants exercise their options and pay
them o®. See section 2.
51If he decided not to exercise his option under Bebchuk's proposal, he could submit
22cents, he pays this price to get a share. If the market price is between 20
cents and 70 cents, he gets each share for a net price of 20 cents. Should the
market price be over 70 cents, this participant of class 2 gets no shares but a
dollar for every dollar he had a claim for. If one of the most senior creditors
wants to guarantee himself the same result as under Bebchuk's scheme, he
has to bid 20 cents for each share, bidding for a number of shares ¯ve times
as high as the amount of dollars the insolvent ¯rm owed him. Certainly, no
participant is obliged to simulate the option process by his bidding. The
participants can do better by using their estimates of a share's value.52
What about the problem that the market often undervalues the ¯rm,
which was the starting point of Bebchuk's proposal?53 This undervaluation
may still exist but it gives the participants no reason to complain under the
speci¯ed auction rule. The participants cannot object, at least no more than
under Bebchuk's scheme,54 because each of them can submit his own bid
according to his own evaluation and thereby guarantee himself everything
he believes to be entitled to. Therefore, the perceived underestimation of
the ¯rm's value by the market is due only to other estimates by other par-
ticipants. Each single participant cannot complain but wins through the
opportunity to buy shares at a low price.
It is not really surprising that the market is fairer than Bebchuk's scheme.
The main idea for using options was that everyone can use his own estimate
of the ¯rm's value and has therefore no reason to complain.55 However, the
market mechanism proposed here allows everyone to use his own estimate,
too, and has some additional advantages, e.g. the uniform market price.
The market is an ambiguous entity. The fairness of the market depends
on its organization. If the ¯rm is sold as a whole in an auction, single
no bid in the auction and would get no less and sometimes more than under Bebchuk's
proposal.
52Thereby they should be careful of the winner's curse.
53For Bebchuk (1988), p. 789, \the primary rationale for the existence of the reorga-
nization alternative to liquidation is the concern that the market often undervalues such
companies". See also 3.3.
54Some of the reasons for complaining given in section 3 still remain, especially the
possibility of lacking money (see 3.5) to exercise the options or, in this case, to bid for
shares. Even these problems are reduced because the market price may be lower than the
exercising price, so that less money is needed to get shares, or higher, so that the creditors
receive more money without buying shares.
55See section 2.
23participants may be unable to in°uence the price and have to take what they
get. Therefore, they could complain. If, instead, shares of the ¯rm are sold as
proposed in this paper, single participants may still lack the power to change
the price, but they can decide whether they like money or shares better at
any given price. Thereby they have less reason to complain than by using
the options as Bebchuk proposes.
5 Conclusion
There are several good reasons for objecting to the outcome of Bebchuk's
proposed insolvency procedure. The most important one in regard to fairness
is that junior participants do not get the expected value of what they are
entitled to.56 They are forced to estimate the company's value, but they
can only lose when there is a discrepency between the estimated and the
real value. Winners of this violation of absolute priority are the more senior
participants. Senior participants also pro¯t from restricted ¯nancial resources
of the junior participants. Junior participants can lose what they are entitled
to if they lack the money needed to exercise their options.
These violations of absolute priority are speci¯c to Bebchuk's proposal.
Other possible insolvency procedures { like a reorganization according to
Chapter 11, a distribution of shares following a central estimation of the
company's value by a judge or an investment bank or selling the ¯rm as a
whole by an auction { do not have these problems. They certainly have prob-
lems of their own, but it was not intended to compare the qualities of these
di®erent procedures in this paper. Instead, it was supposed to be demon-
strated that Bebchuk's proposal should not be included in such a comparison
because, in any case, it is fairer to sell the ¯rm's shares in the market by using
an auction.
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